integrated information theory (IIT)

Compiled with AI assistance and selectively reviewed. Please consult the cited passages; the books remain the authoritative source. About this companion

Editorial synthesis · provisional

Definition

Integrated Information Theory is Tononi’s theory identifying conscious experience with an irreducible integrated cause–effect structure of a physical system. RB2 distinguishes experiential unity from specificity, quantity of integration from qualitative structure, and the theory’s claims from the author’s limited borrowing. Its empirical standing is disputed; integration is not treated here as established proof of feeling, nor as identical to generic information processing or bodily homeostasis.

Explanation

IIT’s formal proposal concerns a system’s intrinsic causal organization, rather than the amount of input data or number of components alone. RB2’s camera and cerebellum comparisons illustrate why differentiated elements must also be integrated on this account. Phi concerns quantity, while the particular cause–effect organization is proposed to correspond to experiential character.

The embodiment discussion identifies a tension: IIT need not require biological life, whereas Cea and Signorelli ask it to incorporate bodily organization more adequately. The later Damasio places homeostatic feeling at its subcortical source, rather than requiring later integration to confer felt status. RB2 explicitly refuses to erase that difference.

The author says the identity is posited rather than derived, records disputed standing and a test challenging predictions of both IIT and Global Workspace, and adopts a deflationary interpretation different from Damasio’s own. Reproduced AI praise elsewhere is a separate source voice, not independent certification. The entry retains a theory under discussion rather than a settled consciousness detector.

Scope and attribution

Retain the theory’s identity claim as attributed, its disputed standing and the expressly limited cross-book use.

AB — The Actual Book

The native consciousness note distinguishes functional models from the author’s philosophical position.

Occurrence locators: Notes: 240.

PB — The Possible Book

The reproduced AI exchange invokes Tononi but is not independent empirical evidence.

Occurrence locators: Reproduced AI exchange: 16.

RB2 — The Real Book, Volume II: Becoming Is Being

An attributed identity theory retains disputed evidence, embodiment critiques and the author’s limited interpretation.

Occurrence locators: 2, 3, 10, 24, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39.

RB3 — The Real Book, Volume III: Murmurations

Source-verified occurrence; see the printed-page references below.

Occurrence locators: Reproduced AI exchange: 400.

Background used in the editorial explanation

Named theories and mechanisms are distinguished from neighboring background, homonyms and the author’s own synthesis. Reproduced AI passages retain their separate voice.