evolutionary epistemology

Compiled with AI assistance and selectively reviewed. Please consult the cited passages; the books remain the authoritative source. About this companion

Editorial synthesis · provisional

Definition

Evolutionary epistemology treats cognition and knowledge as historically formed through adaptive processes rather than as access to timeless certainty from outside nature. The corpus distinguishes Riedl’s account of evolved cognitive capacities from Popper’s and Campbell’s variation-and-criticism account of theories. Both remain fallible: adaptive origins do not prove every belief true, and a theory’s survival under criticism does not confer final certainty.

Explanation

Riedl, following Lorenz, describes categories as a priori for the individual yet acquired through phylogenetic history. RB3 adds recognition and explanation as complementary evolved modes, with continuing expectation–experience correction. It explicitly denies infallibility, particularly beyond ancestral conditions. The proposal keeps this account of cognitive capacities separate from a literal selection of published theories.

Popper’s conjecture, error-elimination and new-problem cycle concerns critical inquiry; Campbell supplies the variation-and-selective-retention genealogy. RB1’s Hull discussion adds replication through publication, teaching and institutional uptake. Empirical adequacy and social persistence are related conditions of scientific practice, not identical measures of truth.

RB3 acknowledges the circularity of using cognition’s own evolutionary story to prove its reliability. The author assigns realist weight to independent recurrence and resistance, using evolution to explain recognizability instead. PB likewise permits the world to refuse the expected question or answer. The entry therefore preserves a fallible explanation, not a foundational guarantee.

Scope and attribution

Preserve two senses and the explicit nonfoundational use of the evolutionary explanation.

AB — The Actual Book

Native notes distinguish Popper’s epistemic role and Campbell’s named triad.

Occurrence locators: Notes: 239, 245; Appendix: 269.

RB1 — The Real Book, Volume I: The Possible Is Real

Evolved capacities and provisional critical selection of theories remain two distinct accounts.

Occurrence locators: 196, 197, 238, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 280, 285; Notes: 269.

RB3 — The Real Book, Volume III: Murmurations

Campbell’s genealogy, cognitive fallibility and the explicit circularity limit are retained.

Occurrence locators: 78, 92, 99, 103, 123, 124, 125, 126, 128, 135.

Background used in the editorial explanation

Named theories and mechanisms are distinguished from neighboring background, homonyms and the author’s own synthesis. Reproduced AI passages retain their separate voice.